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Abstract
We address the problem of verifying clique avoidance in the TTP protocol. TTP allows
several stations embedded in a car to communicate. It has many mechanisms to ensure
robustness to faults. In particular, it has an algorithm that allows a station to recognize
itself as faulty and leave the communication. This algorithm must satisfy the crucial
’non-clique’ property: it is impossible to have two or more disjoint groups of stations
communicating exclusively with stations in their own group. In this paper, we propose
an automatic verification method for an arbitrary number of stations N and a given
number of faults k. We give an abstraction that allows to model the algorithm by means
of unbounded (parametric) counter automata. We have checked the non-clique property
on this model in the case of one fault, using the ALV tool as well as the LASH tool.
KEYWORDS: Formal verification, fault-tolerant protocols, parametric counter automata,
abstraction
1 Introduction
The verification of complex systems, especially of software systems, requires the
adoption of powerful methodologies based on combining, and sometimes iterat-
ing, several analysis techniques. A widely adopted approach consists in combining
abstraction techniques with verification algorithms (e.g., model-checking, symbolic
reachability analysis, see, e.g., (Graf and Saidi 1997; Abdulla et al. 1999; Saidi and Shankar 1999)).
In this approach, non-trivial abstraction steps are necessary to construct faith-
ful abstract models (typically finite-state models) on which the required proper-
ties can be automatically verified. The abstraction steps can be extremely hard
to carry out depending on how restricted the targeted class of abstract mod-
els is. Indeed, many aspects in the behavior of complex software systems cannot
(or can hardly) be captured using finite-state models. Among these aspects, we
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can mention, e.g., (1) the manipulation of variables and data-structures (coun-
ters, queues, arrays, etc.) ranging over infinite domains, (2) parameterization (e.g.,
sizes of the data structures, the number of components in the system, the rates of
errors/faults/losses, etc.). For this reason, it is often needed to consider abstrac-
tion steps which yield infinite-state models corresponding to extended automata,
i.e., a finite-control automata supplied with unbounded data-structures (e.g., timed
automata, pushdown automata, counter automata, FIFO-channel automata, finite-
state transducers, etc.) (Abdulla et al. 1999). Then, symbolic reachability analy-
sis algorithms (see, e.g., (Cousot and Halbwachs 1978; Boigelot and Wolper 1994;
Bouajjani et al. 1997; Bouajjani and Habermehl 1997; Kesten et al. 1997; Bultan et al. ;
Wolper and Boigelot ; Bouajjani et al. 2000; Annichini et al. 2000; Abdulla and Jonsson 2001a;
Abdulla and Jonsson 2001b)) can be applied on these (abstract) extended automata-
based models in order to verify the desired properties of the original (concrete) sys-
tem. Of course, abstraction steps remain non-trivial in general for complex systems,
even if infinite-state extended automata are used as abstract models.
In this paper, we consider verification problems concerning a protocol used in
the automotive and aerospace industry. The protocol, called TTP/C, was designed
at the Technical University of Vienna in order to allow communication between
several devices (micro-processors) embedded in a car or plane, whose function is to
control the safe execution of different driving actions (Kopetz and Gru¨nsteidl 1999;
Kopetz 1999).
The protocol involves many mechanisms to ensure robustness to faults. In partic-
ular, the protocol involves implicit and explicit mechanisms which allow to discard
devices (called stations) which are (supposed to be) faulty. This mechanism must
ensure the crucial property: all active stations form one single group of communi-
cating stations, i.e., it is impossible to have two (or more) disjoint groups of active
stations communicating exclusively with stations in their own group.
Actually, the algorithm is very subtle and its verification is a real challenge for
formal and automatic verification methods. Roughly, it is a parameterized algorithm
forN stations arranged in a ring topology. Each of the stations broadcasts a message
to all stations when it is its turn to emit. The turn of each station is determined
by a fixed time schedule. Stations maintain informations corresponding to their
view of the global state of the system: a membership vector, consisting of an array
with a parametric size N , telling which stations are active. Stations exchange their
views of the system and this allows them to recognize faulty stations. Each time a
station sends a message, it sends also the result of a calculation which encodes its
membership vector. Stations compare their membership vectors to those received
from sending stations. If a receiver disagrees with the membership vector of the
sender, it counts the received message as incorrect. If a station disagrees with a
majority of stations (in the round since the last time the station has emitted), it
considers itself as faulty and leaves the active mode (it refrains from emitting and
skips its turn). Stations which are inactive can return later to the active mode
(details are given in the paper). Besides the membership vector, each station s
maintains two integer counters in order to count in the last round (since the previous
emission of the station s) (1) the number of stations which have emitted and from
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which s has received a correct message with membership vector equal to its own
vector at that moment (the stations may disagree later concerning some other
emitting station), and (2) the number of stations from which s received an incorrect
message (the incorrect message may be due to a transmission fault or to a different
membership vector). The information maintained by each station s depends tightly
on its position in the ring relatively to the positions of the faulty stations and
relatively to the stations which agree/disagree with s w.r.t. each fault.
The proof of correctness of the algorithm and its automatic verification are far
from being straightforward, especially in the parametric case, i.e., for any number
of stations, and any number of faults.
The first contribution of this paper is to prove that the algorithm stabilizes to a
state where all membership vectors are equal after precisely two rounds from the
occurrence of the last fault in any sequence of faults. The proof is given for the gen-
eral case where re-integrating stations are allowed. To guarantee stabilization after
k-faults in the case of re-integration, we propose an algorithm slightly different from
the one presented in (Kopetz and Gru¨nsteidl 1999), which guarantees stabilization
in the case of 1 fault only. The generalization to k faults makes an assumption
on the failure model (made explicit in section 2) that may not be realistic for a
particular kind of messages called N-frames (Kopetz and Gru¨nsteidl 1999).
Then, we address the problem of verifying automatically the algorithm. We prove
that, for every fixed number of faults k, it is possible to construct an abstraction of
the algorithm (parameterized by the number of stations N) by means of a paramet-
ric counter automaton. This result is surprising since (1) it is not easy to abstract
the information related to the topology of the system (ordering between the sta-
tions in the ring), and (2) each station (in the concrete algorithm) has local variables
ranging over infinite domains (two counters and an array with parametric bounds).
The difficulty is to prove that it is possible to encode the information needed by all
stations by means of a finite number of counters. Basically, this is done as follows:
(1) We observe that a sequence of faults induces a partition of the set of active
stations (classes correspond to stations having the same membership vector) which
is built by successive refinements: Initially, all stations are in the same set, and the
occurrence of each fault has the effect of splitting the class containing the faulty
station into two subclasses (stations which recognizes the fault, and the other ones).
(2) We show that there is a partition of the ring into a finite number of regions (de-
pending on the positions of the faulty stations) such that, to determine at any time
whether a station of any class can emit, it is enough to know how many stations
in the different classes/zones have emitted in the last two rounds. This counting is
delicate due to the splitting of the classes after each fault.
Finally, we show that, given a counter automaton modeling the algorithm, the
stabilization property (after 2 rounds following the last fault) can be expressed as a
constrained reachability property (in CTL with Presburger predicates) which can be
checked using symbolic reachability analysis tools for counter automata (e.g., ALV
(Bultan and Yavuz-Kahveci 2001) or LASH (LASH 2002)). We have experimented
this approach in the case of one fault. We have built a model for the algorithm in the
language of ALV, and we have been able to verify automatically that it converges to
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Fig. 1. A TDMA round for 3 stations.
a single clique after precisely two rounds from the occurrence of the fault. Actually,
we have provided a refinement of the abstraction given in the general case which
allows to build a simpler automaton. This refinement is based on properties specific
to the 1 fault case that has been checked automatically using ALV.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the protocol. In Section
3, we prove the crucial non-clique property for n stations: the stations that are
still active do have the same membership vector at the end of the second round
following fault k. Considering the 1 fault case, section 4 presents how to abstract the
protocol parameterized by the number of stations n as an automaton with counters
that can be symbolically model checked. Section 5 generalizes the approach for a
given number of faults k. Section 6 concludes the paper. A preliminary version of
this paper has appeared in (Bouajjani and Merceron 2002).
2 Informal Description of the Protocol
TTP is a time-triggered protocol. It has a finite set S of N stations and allows
them to communicate via a shared bus. Messages are broadcast to all stations via
the bus. Each station that participates in the communication sends a message when
it is the right time to do so. Therefore, access to the bus is determined by a time
division multiple access (TDMA) schema controlled by the global time generated by
the protocol. A TDMA round is divided into time slots. The stations are statically
ordered in a ring and time slots are allocated to the stations according to their order.
During its time slot, a station has exclusive message sending rights. A TDMA round
for three stations is shown in Figure 1. When one round is completed, a next one
takes place following the same pattern.
TTP is a fault-tolerant protocol. Stations may fail while other stations con-
tinue communicating with each other. TTP provides different services to ensure
robustness to faults, such as replication of stations, replication of communica-
tion channels, bus guardian, fault-tolerant clock synchronization algorithm, im-
plicit acknowledgment, clique avoidance mechanism, (Kopetz and Gru¨nsteidl 1999;
Kopetz 1999; Bauer and Paulitsch 2000). Several classes of faults are distinguished.
(Steiner et al. 2004), for example, focuses on faults that may appear at startup. In
this paper, we focuse on asymmetric faults. A symmetric fault occurs when a sta-
tion is send faulty, i.e., no other station can receive it properly, or receive faulty, i.e.,
it cannot receive properly any message. Asymmetric faults occur when an emitting
station is received properly by more than 1 station, but less then all stations. We
allow asymmetric faults to occur and consider symmetric faults as a special case of
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asymmetric faults. For the protocol to work well, it is essential that (asymmetric)
faults do not give rise to cliques. In (Kopetz and Gru¨nsteidl 1999; Kopetz 1999)
cliques are understood as disjoint sets of stations communicating exclusively with
each other. In this paper, we focus on implicit acknowledgment and clique avoidance
mechanism, to be introduced shortly, and show that they prevent the formation of
different cliques, clique is cast in its graph theoretical meaning.
2.1 Local Information
When it is working or in the active state, a station sends messages in its time slot,
listens to messages broadcast by other stations and carries local calculations. Each
station s stores locally some information, in particular a membership vector ms
and two counters, CAccs and CFails. A membership vector is an array of booleans
indexed by S, the set formed by the N stations. It indicates the stations that
s receives correctly (in a sense that will be made precise below). If s received
correctly the last message, also called frame, sent by s′, then ms[s
′] = 1, otherwise
ms[s
′] = 0. A sending station is supposed to receive itself properly, thus ms[s] = 1
for a working station s. The counters CAccs and CFails are used as follows. When
it is ready to send, s resets CAccs and CFails to 0. During the subsequent round, s
increases CAccs by 1 each time it receives a correct frame (this includes the frame
it is sending itself) and it increases CFails by 1 each time it receives an incorrect
frame. When no frame is sent (because the station that should send is not working),
neither CFails nor CAccs are increased.
2.2 Implicit Acknowledgment
Frames are broadcast over the bus to all stations but they are not explicitly ac-
knowledged. TTP has implicit acknowledgment. A frame is composed of a header,
denoted by h in Figure 1, a data field, denoted by data and a CRC field denoted
by crc. The data field contains the data, like sensor-recorded data, that a station
wants to broadcast. The CRC field contains the calculation of the Cyclic Redun-
dancy Check done by the sending station. CRC is calculated over the header, the
data field and the individual membership vector. When station s is sending, it puts
in the CRC field the calculation it has done with its own membership vector ms.
Station s′ receiving a frame from station s recognizes the frame as valid if all the
fields have the expected lengths. If the frame is valid, station s′ performs a CRC
calculation over the header and the data field it has just received, and its own mem-
bership vector ms′ . It recognizes the frame as correct if it has recognized it as valid
and its CRC calculation agrees with the one put by s in the CRC field. Therefore,
a correct CRC implies that sender s and receiver s′ have the same membership
vector.
We also assume a converse: if s and s′ do not have the same membership vector,
the CRC is not correct. This assumption may be strong and may not be met by
special messages of TTP called N-frames. However, it is valid for X-frames and
I-frames.
6 A. Bouajjani and A. Merceron
During normal operation, the sender s performs two CRC checks over the frame
received from its first successor s′:
CheckIa CRC calculation with ms[s] = 1 and ms[s
′] = 1.
CheckIb CRC calculation with ms[s] = 0 and ms[s
′] = 1.
If the CRC CheckIa is correct, s knows that s and s′ have identical membership
vectors, so it implicitly deduces that its successor s′ has received its frame. Thus s
assumes that it is not faulty, ms[s] remains 1 and CheckIb is discarded. It increases
CAccs by one. One says that s has reached its membership point.
If both CheckIa and CheckIb fail, it is assumed that some transient disturbance
has corrupted the frame of s′. Thus ms[s
′] is put to 0 and CFails is increased by 1.
The next station becomes the first successor of s.
When CheckIa fails but CheckIb passes, either s could be send faulty or s′ could
be receive faulty. According to the confidence principle, s assumes the latter, puts
the membership of s′ to 0 and increases CFails by 1. However, s performs further
similar checks over the frame received from the next successor s′′ for double check:
CheckIIa CRC calculation with ms[s] = 1 and ms[s
′] = 0.
CheckIIb CRC calculation with ms[s] = 0 and ms[s
′] = 1.
If CheckIIa passes, s is confirmed that s′ is received faulty. It increases CAccs by 1
(for s′′) and CheckIIb is discarded. Again, s has reached its membership point.
If CheckIIb passes, s assumes that it is itself send faulty and s′ is non-faulty and
leaves the active state.
If both CheckIIa and CheckIIb fail, s considers that s′′ is faulty. Therefore it puts
ms[s
′′] = 0, it increases CFails by 1 and will perform CheckIIa and CheckIIb again
with the next successor following the same procedure.
It is assumed that at least 3 stations are active.
2.3 Clique Avoidance Mechanism
The clique avoidance mechanism reads as follows: Once per round, at the beginning
of its time slot, a station s checks whether CAccs > CFails. If it is the case, it
resets both counters as already said above and sends a message. If it is not the
case, the station fails. It puts its own membership vector bit to 0, i.e., ms[s] = 0,
and leaves the active state, thus will not send in the subsequent rounds. The
intuition behind this mechanism is that a station that fails to recognize a majority
of frames as correct, is most probably not working properly. Other working stations,
not receiving anything during the time slot of s, put the bit of s to 0 in their own
membership vector.
It should be noted that implicit acknowledgment and clique avoidance mechanism
interfere with each other, which contributes to make the analysis of the algorithm
difficult.
2.4 Re-integration
Faulty stations that have left the active state can re-integrate the active state (Kopetz 1999;
Bauer and Paulitsch 2000). The re-integration algorithm that we describe here dif-
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fers slightly from the one proposed in (Kopetz and Gru¨nsteidl 1999) to guarantee
stabilisation after k faults. The algorithm proposed in (Kopetz and Gru¨nsteidl 1999)
is enough to guarantee stabilisation after 1 fault, but not after k faults. A major
difference is that re-integration, with our algorithm, may last longer, since a station,
once it has acquired a membership vector, has to listen at least a full round before
beeing able to send a frame, which is not necessarily the case with the algorithm
proposed in (Kopetz and Gru¨nsteidl 1999).
A re-integrating station s copies the membership vector from some active sta-
tion. As soon as the integrating station has a copy, it updates its membership vector
listening to the traffic following the same algorithm as other working stations. Dur-
ing its first sending slot, it resets both counters, CAccs and CFails to 0, without
sending any frame. During the following round, it increases its counters and keeps
updating its membership vector as working stations do. At the beginning of its next
sending slot, s checks whether CAccs > CFails. If it is the case, it puts ms[s] to 1
and sends a frame, otherwise it leaves the active state again. Receiving stations,
if they detect a valid frame, put the membership of s to 1 and then perform the
CRC checks as described above.
2.5 Example
Consider a set S composed of 4 stations and suppose that all stations received
correct frames from each other for a while. This means that they all have identi-
cal membership vectors and CFail = 0. After station s3 has sent, the membership
vectors as well as counters CAcc and CFail look as follows. Remember that there
is no global resetting of CAcc and CFail. Resetting is relative to the position of the
sending station.
stations m[s0] m[s1] m[s2] m[s3] CAcc CFail
s0 1 1 1 1 4 0
s1 1 1 1 1 3 0
s2 1 1 1 1 2 0
s3 1 1 1 1 1 0
We suppose that a fault occurs while s0 is sending and that no subsequent fault
occurs for at least two rounds, calculated from the time slot of s0. We assume also
that the frame sent by s0 is recognized as correct by s2 only. So the set S is split
in two subsets, S1 = {s0, s2} and S0 = {s1, s3}.
1. Membership vectors and counters after s0 has sent:
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stations m[s0] m[s1] m[s2] m[s3] CAcc CFail
s0 1 1 1 1 1 0
s1 0 1 1 1 3 1
s2 1 1 1 1 3 0
s3 0 1 1 1 1 1
2. Membership vectors and counters after s1 has sent. At this point CheckIa
fails but CheckIb passes for s0. However, CheckIa passes for s3 (because of
the fault, both CheckIa and CheckIb failed in the preceding time slot for s3).
Notice that s2 does not have the same membership vector as s1, so it does
not recognize the frame sent by s1 as correct.
stations m[s0] m[s1] m[s2] m[s3] CAcc CFail
s0 1 0 1 1 1 1
s1 0 1 1 1 1 0
s2 1 0 1 1 3 1
s3 0 1 1 1 2 1
3. Membership vectors and counters after s2 has sent. Now CheckIIa passes for
s0, but both CheckIa and CheckIb fail for s1 because its membership vector
differs with the one of s2 on s0. s3 does not have the same membership vector
as s2, so it does not recognize the frame sent by s2 as correct.
stations m[s0] m[s1] m[s2] m[s3] CAcc CFail
s0 1 0 1 1 2 1
s1 0 1 0 1 1 1
s2 1 0 1 1 1 0
s3 0 1 0 1 2 2
4. Memberships and counters after the time slot of s3, which cannot send due
to the clique avoidance mechanism and leaves the active state:
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stations m[s0] m[s1] m[s2] m[s3] CAcc CFail
s0 1 0 1 0 2 1
s1 0 1 0 0 1 1
s2 1 0 1 0 1 0
s3 0 0 0 0 0 0
5. Memberships and counters after s0 has sent again. At this point CheckIa
succeeds for s2 while s1 is still looking for a first successor.
stations m[s0] m[s1] m[s2] m[s3] CAcc CFail
s0 1 0 1 0 1 0
s1 0 1 0 0 1 2
s2 1 0 1 0 2 0
s3 0 0 0 0 0 0
6. Memberships and counters after the time slot of s1, which cannot send due
the clique avoidance mechanism and leaves the active state:
stations m[s0] m[s1] m[s2] m[s3] CAcc CFail
s0 1 0 1 0 1 0
s1 0 0 0 0 0 0
s2 1 0 1 0 2 0
s3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Membership vectors are coherent again at this point of time.
3 Proving Clique Avoidance
In this section we prove that if k faults occur at a rate of more than 1 fault per two
TDMA rounds and if no fault occur during two rounds following fault k, then at
the end of that second round, all active stations have the same membership vector,
so they form a single clique in the graph theoretical sense.
Let us denote by W the subset of S that contains all working stations. We may
write ms = S
′ for a station s with S′ ⊆ S as a short hand for ms[s′] = 1 iff s′ ∈ S′.
To prove coherence of membership vectors we start with the following situation.
We suppose that stations of W have identical membership vectors and all have
CFails = 0. Because ms[s] = 1 for any working station, this implies that ms = W
for any s ∈ W . Faults occur from this initial state.
Let us define a graph as follows : the nodes are the stations, and there is an
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arc between s and s′ iff ms[s
′] = 1. We recall that, in graph theory, a clique is a
complete subgraph, i.e., each pair of nodes is related by an arc. Thus initially, W
forms a single clique in the graph theoretical sense.
3.1 Introductory Example
Let us illustrate how things might work in the case of two faults. The first fault
occurs when s0 sends. We suppose that only s1 fails to receive correctly the frame
sent by s0. S is split as S1 = {s0, s2, s3} and S0 = {s1}. Membership vectors and
counters after s0 has sent. At this point, CheckIa passes for s3.
stations m[s0] m[s1] m[s2] m[s3] CAcc CFail
s0 1 1 1 1 1 0
s1 0 1 1 1 3 1
s2 1 1 1 1 3 0
s3 1 1 1 1 2 0
Notice that {s0, s1, s2, s3}, do not form a clique anymore, the arc (s1, s0) is missing.
Membership vectors and counters after s1 has sent. At this point, CheckIa fails
but CheckIb passes for s0. s2 and s3 do not have the same membership vector as
s1, so they don’t accept its frame as correct.
stations m[s0] m[s1] m[s2] m[s3] CAcc CFail
s0 1 0 1 1 1 1
s1 0 1 1 1 1 0
s2 1 0 1 1 3 1
s3 1 0 1 1 2 1
Membership vectors and counters after s2 has sent. At this point, we suppose
that a second fault occurs. Neither s3 nor s0 recognize the frame sent by s2 as
correct. S1 is split in S11 = {s2} and S10 = {s0, s3}. At this point, s0 keeps looking
for a second successor and both CheckIa and CheckIb fail for s1.
stations m[s0] m[s1] m[s2] m[s3] CAcc CFail
s0 1 0 0 1 1 2
s1 0 1 0 1 1 1
s2 1 0 1 1 1 0
s3 1 0 0 1 2 2
Parametric Verification of a Group Membership Algorithm 11
Membership vectors and counters after the time slot of s3, which is prevented
from sending because of the clique avoidance mechanism:
stations m[s0] m[s1] m[s2] m[s3] CAcc CFail
s0 1 0 0 0 1 2
s1 0 1 0 0 1 1
s2 1 0 1 0 1 0
s3 0 0 0 0 0 0
One notices that s0, then s1 are prevented from sending because of the clique
avoidance mechanism. Membership vectors and counters after the time slot of s1:
stations m[s0] m[s1] m[s2] m[s3] CAcc CFail
s0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s1 0 0 0 0 0 0
s2 0 0 1 0 1 0
s3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Coherence is achieved again after the time slot of s1, where s2 remains the only
active station. Though S11 is smaller than S10, the position of s2 in the ring as
the first station of the round with the second fault allows it to capitalize on frames
accepted in the round before and to win over the set S10.
3.2 Proving a Single Clique after k Faults
The proof proceeds as follows. First we show a preliminary result. If W is divided
into subsets Si in such a way that all stations in a subset have the same membership
vector, then stations inside a subset behave similarly: if there is no fault, they
recognize the same frames as correct or as incorrect. Frames sent by stations from
their own subset are the ones that they recognize as correct, while frames sent by
stations from other subsets are all recognized as incorrect.
Then we show that the occurrence of faults does produce such a partitioning, i.e.,
after fault k,W is divided into subsets Sw, where w ∈ {0, 1}k. Indeed, as illustrated
by the example above, after 1 fault,W is split in S1, the stations that recognize the
frame as correct, and S0, the stations that do not recognize the frame as correct.
Because any station recognizes itself as correct, S1 is not empty. Now, suppose that
a second fault occurs. Assume that the second fault occurs when a station from set
S1 sends. As before, set S1 splits into S11, the stations that recognize the frame
as correct, and S10, the stations that do not recognize the frame as correct. Again
S11 is not empty. Set S0 becomes S00 because stations in S0 don’t have the same
membership vector as stations in S1. And the process generalizes. If a station s
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from a set Sw sends when fault k occurs, Sw splits into Sw1 and Sw0 with Sw1 6= ∅.
Then, we show that two stations s and s′ have the same membership vector if and
only if they belong to the same set Sw. Using the preliminary lemma, we have a
result about the incrementation of the counters CAcc and CFail, namely, all stations
from a set Sw increment CAcc if a station from Sw sends, and increment CFail if a
station from Sw′ sends, where w 6= w
′. From this, we can deduce our main result:
in the second round after fault k, only stations from a single set Sw can send. It
follows that, at the end of that second round, there can be at most only one clique.
First we give a lemma that says that, if two stations have the same membership
vector, then they recognize mutually their frames as correct.
Lemma 1
Let s and s′ ∈W with ms = ms′ . Then, ms[s
′] = 1 and ms′ [s] = 1.
Proof
s, s′ ∈ W means ms[s] = 1 and ms′ [s′] = 1. Because s and s′ have the same
membership vector, one has ms[s
′] = 1 and ms′ [s] = 1.
Now we give our preliminary result when active stations are divided into subsets
Si in such a way that all stations in a subset have the same membership vector.
Proposition 2
Suppose that W is divided into m subsets S1, . . . , Sm such that s and s
′ have the
same membership vector iff s and s′ belong to the same subset Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Let
s ∈ Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Assume that no fault occurs. Then, each time some other station
s′ is sending:
1. if s′ ∈ Si, s increases CAccs by 1 and keeps the membership bit of s′ to 1,
2. If s′ ∈ Sj , j 6= i,
(a) either s increases CFails by 1 and puts the membership bit of s
′
to 0,
(b) or s leaves the active state.
Proof
We prove this proposition for the general case where integrating stations are allowed.
Let s ∈ Si, or, if s is a station about to integrate, suppose it has copied its mem-
bership vector from an active station belonging to Si.
First suppose s′ ∈ Si or, if s′ is an integrating station, s′ has copied its membership
vector from some active station s′′ ∈ Si. Following the integration policy, both s
and s′ put the membership bit of s′ to 1 when s′ sends. Because s and s′ have
the same membership vector and because no other fault occurs, s recognizes as
correct the frame sent by s′. So it increases CAccs by 1 when s
′ sends and keeps
the membership bit of s′ to 1, also if s is performing CheckIa or CheckIIa.
Suppose now s′ ∈ Sj , j 6= i. As above, if s′ is an integrating station, s′ has copied its
membership vector from some active station s′′ ∈ Sj . Because s and s′ do not have
the same membership vector, s does not recognize the frame sent by s′ as correct.
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If s has reached its membership point already or is a station about to integrate, it
increases CFails by 1 and puts the membership bit of s
′ to 0.
If s has not reached its membership point yet, it performs either checkI or CheckII.
Suppose first s performs CheckIa and CheckIb, i.e., s′ could be the first successor
of s. Because s′ ∈ Sj, CheckIa does not pass. Hence, s increases CFails by 1 and
puts the membership bit of s′ to 0.
Suppose now s performs CheckIIa and CheckIIb, i.e., s′ could be the second suc-
cessor of s. If s and s′ disagree only on the bit for s, then CheckIIb fails for s
which leaves the active state. Otherwise, s simply does not recognize as correct the
frame sent by s′; it increases CFails by 1, puts the membership bit of s
′ to 0 (and
continues looking for a second successor).
Now we prove a crucial proposition. Namely, occurence of faults divide the active
stations into subsets characterized by their membership vectors.
Proposition 3
At the end of the time slot of sk, the station where fault k occurs k ≥ 1, W is
partitioned into subsets Sw, with w ∈ {0, 1}k, such that two stations s ∈ Sw and
s′ ∈ Sw′ have the same membership vector iff w = w′.
Proof
We proceed by induction on k.
Basis : k = 1. Let s1 be the station which is sending when the first fault occurs.
Before the time slot of s1, all active stations, plus s1 if s1 is an integrating station,
have the same membership vector, namely W , by hypothesis on the initial state.
In case s1 is an integrating station, all stations put the membership bit of s1 to 1
by the integrating station policy. We denote by S0 the subset of W that failed to
receive correctly the frame sent by s1 while we denote by S1 the subset of stations
that accepted the frame as correct.
All stations in S1 could receive correctly the frame sent by s
1, consequently their
membership vectors do not change. None of the station in S0 could receive correctly
the frame sent by s1 because of the fault. Hence they all put the membership bit
of s1 to false, also in the case where s1 was an integrating station. Thus they all
have the same membership vector, namely W \ {s1}.
Suppose the result is true till fault k − 1.
Induction step : we prove that the result is true for k, k > 1. Let sk be the
station which is sending when fault k occurs. By induction hypothesis, at the end
of the time slot of sk−1, W is partitioned into sets Sw with w ∈ {0|1}
k−1. There is
a unique w ∈ {0|1}k−1 with sk ∈ Sw or such that the membership vector of s
k is
identical to stations of Sw, in case s
k is an integrating station.
First, we show that Sw splits into Sw0 and Sw1. By Lemma 1, ms[s
k] = 1 for any
station s ∈ Sw. Let us denote by Sw1 the subset of Sw that could receive sk correctly
and by Sw0 the subset of Sw that could not receive s
k correctly. Obviously, Sw1 and
Sw0 partition Sw. After the time slot of s
k, all stations in Sw1 keep the membership
of sk to 1, while all stations in Sw0 put it to 0. Thus s, s
′ ∈ Sw have the same
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membership vector if and only if s, s′ ∈ Sw1 or s, s′ ∈ Sw0.
Consider some w′ ∈ {0|1}k−1, with w′ 6= w and Sw′ 6= ∅. Let s′ ∈ Sw′ . We show that
Sw′ becomes Sw′0 and that the condition on the membership vectors still holds.
w′ 6= w means that the ms′ and msk differ on some bit s
∗. So, s′ cannot recognize
as correct the frame sent by sk and Sw′ can be denoted by Sw′0.
Obviously, ∀s ∈ Sw1 : ms′ 6= ms. Could it be that now stations Sw′0 and Sw0
have the same membership vector? This could be only if their membership vectors
differed only on the bit for sk. But this would mean that station sk has already
emitted, that a fault occured and station in Sw′ did not accept the frame as correct
while stations in Sw did. Because all stations emit in one round, some station u
from Sw′ has emitted. By Proposition 2, membership vectors of stations in Sw′ and
Sw differ on u and u 6= sk. Hence, stations Sw′0 and Sw0 have different memberships
vectors. Using a similar argument, membership vectors of stations in Sw′′0 and Sw′0
remain different with w′′ ∈ {0|1}k−1, w′ 6= w′′ 6= w and Sw′′ 6= ∅.
Finally, we show that only stations from a unique set Sw are able to send in the
second round following the first fault.
Theorem 4
Suppose some station is able to send in the second round following fault k. Let
us denote this station by s. By Proposition 3, exists some w ∈ {0|1}k such that
s ∈ Sw. Then, only stations from Sw can send in the second round following fault
k.
Proof
Let CAccs and CFails when s performs the clique avoidance mechanism. By Propo-
sition 2, CAccs =| {s′ ∈ Sw s. t. s′ sent in the first round following fault k} | and
CFails = Σw′ 6=w |{s′ ∈ Sw′ s. t. s < s′, and s′ sent in the first round following fault
k}|, where < refers to the statical order among stations. Because s is able to send,
one has CAccs > CFails at the beginning of the time slot of s in the second round.
Let t be the follower station of s in the statical order ready to send after s. Is t
able to send, or is it prevented from sending by the clique avoidance mechanism?
We show that t is able to send if and only if it belongs to Sw.
Suppose t ∈ Sw. When its time slot comes in the second round, it has increased
CAcct by 1 when s has sent in the second round. Because, in the first round following
fault k, t increases its counters as s does by Proposition 2, one has CAcct = CAccs,
or CAcct = CAccs + 1 in case s was an integrating station, and CFailt = CFails at
the beginning of the time slot of t in the second round. Thus CAcct > CFailt and
t is able to send as well.
Suppose now t ∈ Sw′ for some w′ 6= w. CAcct =| {s′ ∈ Sw′ | t ≤ s′ ≤ sk and s′
sent in the first round following fault k}|. Indeed, between sk and its present time
slot, t has not accepted any frame since only s has sent. However, by Proposition 2,
CAcct ≤ CFails since all frames accepted by t are not recognized as correct by s.
For a similar reason, CAccs ≤ CFailt. It follows that, at the beginning of its time
slot, CAcct < CFailt and t is prevented from sending.
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A similar argument can be repeated to all stations ready to send in the second
round giving the result.
From Theorem 4, one deduces that, at the end of the second round following
fault k, for any station s ∈ Sw: ms = Sw. Using Lemma 1, this gives our safety
property about cliques.
Corollary 5
At the end of the second round following fault 1, all working stations form a single
clique in the graph theoretical sense.
4 Automatic Verification: the 1 Fault Case
In the case of a single fault, the setW of active stations is divided into two subsets,
S1 and S0. The set S1 is not empty as it contains s
1, the station that was sending
when the fault occurs. We assume that no other fault occurs for the next two
rounds, a round is taken with the beginning of the time slot of s1. We want to prove
automatically for an arbitrary number N of stations that, at the end of the second
round following the fault, all working stations form a single non-empty clique. To
achieve this goal, we need a formalism to model the protocol and a formalism to
specify the properties that the protocol must satisfy. To model the protocol, we
take synchronous automata extended with parameters and counters. To specify the
properties, we take the temporal logic CTL. To keep the number of parameters as
low as possible, we do not consider re-integrating stations.
To be able to verify automatically the protocol for the parametric case where
the number of stations is a paramater N , we need to abstract the behavioural
model of the N identical extended automata into a single extended automaton.
The abstraction we use is the standard (infinite) counter abstraction and can be
automatized. The novelty and difficulty of our case study, compared with other
examples using a similar abstraction technique (Pnueli et al. 2002; Delzanno 2000),
lies in the fact that each individual extended automaton that models one station has
local infinite variables : two counters, CAcc and CFail, and a membership vector
m that all depends on the paramater N . Applying counter abstraction directly
would lead to a too coarse model, useless for verification. Consequently, before we
apply the abstraction, we perform a transformation of the N extended automata
in order to replace local variables in guards by a finite number of global counters.
The successive models we obtain are related by a (bi)simulation property.
We divide the presentation in four main parts: first, we draw straightforward
consequences from Section 3 for the 1 fault case. Second, we give the behavioural
model of the protocol under the form of N synchronous automata with local vari-
ables. Third we show how we build the abstract model replacing local variables by
a finite number of global counters, strenthening guards and performing the usual
counter abstraction in such a way that each successive model (bi)simulates the pre-
vious one. Finally we give the properties that have been automatically proved on
the resulting model which consists of a single extended automaton. This establishes
the ’non-clique’ property.
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4.1 Properties of the 1-fault case
We will make use of the results presented in this section in the stepwise transfor-
mations where local variables are replaced by a finite number of global counters.
Proposition 6
Let s be the sending station when the fault occurs. In the round following the fault,
the 3 conditions below are equivalent :
1. s leaves the active state after CheckI and CheckII,
2. the two follower stations of s have 1 everywhere in their membership vector,
except for the bit for s which is 0,
3. the two follower stations of s are in S0.
Proof
A simple consequence of the fact that before the fault, all membership vectors are
all equal with 1 in each bit.
Proposition 7
Let s be the sending station when the fault occurs and suppose that no fault occurs
during the two subsequent rounds. Then, only station s can leave the active state
because of CheckI and CheckII in the round following the fault. In later rounds,
CheckI and CheckII do not play any roˆle.
Proof
If s has left because of CheckI and CheckII, there is nothing to prove. Otherwise,
the first or second successor of s belongs to S1, so either CheckIa or CheckIIa
succeeds in this round or in later rounds. Consider now s′ 6= s. Could s′ leave the
active state because of CheckI and CheckII ? Consider s′′ the station sending after
s′. Suppose that CheckIa fails (otherwise there is nothing to prove). This means
that s′ and s′′ have different membership vectors. Because no new fault occurs,
the difference in the membership vector can not be at the bit for s′ only. Thus s′
discards both CheckIa and CheckIb and keeps looking for a first successor.
The result below shows that we can replace the N individual counters CAcc and
CFail by two global counters d0 and d1. Let d1 be a counter to count how many
stations of S1 have sent so far in the round since the fault occurred. Let d0 be a
similar counter for S0. Let s be a station ready to send. Assume s ∈ S1. How much
is CFails ? It is exactly given by d0. How much is CAccs ? Generally, it is more than
d1. One has to add all stations that have emitted before the fault since the last
time slot of s, because s has recognized them all as correct, see Figure 2. However,
this number can be calculated exactly with the help of d1 and d0 only as Theorem
8 shows.
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Fig. 2. Illustrating proof of Theorem 8.
Theorem 8
Let s a station ready to send and suppose there is only 1 fault..
In the round following fault 1:
1. If s ∈ S1, then CAccs =|W | −d0 and CFails = d0.
2. If s ∈ S0, then CAccs =|W | −d1 and CFails = d1.
In later rounds:
1. If s ∈ S1, then CAccs =|S1 | and CFails =|S0 |.
2. If s ∈ S0, then CAccs =|S0 | and CFails =|S1 |.
Proof
First round after the fault. We prove the first item only, the second one being dual.
Since there was no fault in the last round, s has recognized as correct all stations
between itself and s1 in the last round. By Proposition 2, it has recognized as
correct all stations of S1 that have sent so far in the round. This is illustrated in
Figure 2. Thus CAccs =| {s′ | s ≤ s′ < s1} ∩W | +d1, where ≤ and < refer the
statical order among stations. {s′ | s ≤ s′ < s1}∩W =W \({s′ | s1 ≤ s′ < s}∩W ).
Thus | {s′ | s ≤ s′ < s1} ∩W |=|W | −d1 − d0. This gives CAccs =|W | −d0. By
Proposition 2, CFails = d0.
Second and later rounds after the fault. Let s ∈ S1 be the station whose time
slot comes first in the second round. This station is the faulty station itself. By
Proposition 2, CAccs is the number of stations of S1 that could send in the previous
round, i.e., that are still active, which is precisely |S1 |. Similarly, CFails =|S0 |. If
s can send, |S1 | remains unchanged, if s cannot send, |S1 | diminishes by 1. At the
beginning of the follower time slot, |S1 | is exactly the number of stations from S1
that have send in the round preceding this time slot, and similarly for S0. Let us
call s′ the station corresponding to that time slot. If s′ ∈ S1, using Propositions 2,
CAccs′ =| S1 | and CFails =| S0 |. If s′ ∈ S0, the dual is true. If s′ 6∈ S0 ∪ S1, s′
has not send in the preceding round. In any case, at the end of the time slot of s′,
| S1 | is exactly the number of stations from S1 that have send in the round, and
similarly for S0. Using Proposition 2 and repeating the same argument for all time
slots that follow gives the result.
4.2 Behavioural model
We give in this section a formal description of the TTP membership algorithm. For
that, we consider a general specification formalism for parametrized networks. We
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assume that systems can have an arbitrary number N of components which may
share global variables and can have also local variables. Moreover, these components
can communicate by broadcasting messages. To describe the behaviour of each of
the components, we adopt an extended automata-based formalism (described using
the notations of (Manna and Pnueli 1995)) where each transition between control
state is a guarded command which may involve (broadcast) communications. We
assume that the executions of all the parallel components are synchronous following
the semantical model of (Benveniste and Berry 1991) (i.e., all components have the
same speed w.r.t. a global logical clock defining a notion of execution step in the
system, and at each step, all the operations, including broadcast communications,
are instantaneous).
The formal semantics of such models can be defined in terms of a transition
system. A state defines a global configuration of the network corresponding to the
values of the global variables together with the values of all local variables (including
the control states) for each of theN components of the network. Transitions between
states are defined straightforwardly according to the semantical model mentioned
above. The behaviours of the network are defined as the possible execution paths
in the so defined transition system.
Before giving the formal description of the TTP, let us introduce some notations.
We denote the sending of a broadcast message a by a!! and the receiving of a
broadcast message a by a??. Otherwise, ⌊⌉ denotes non-deterministic choice, t⊕⊕
stands for t := t⊕1, i.e., the value of t in the next state is incremented by 1 modulo
N , A++ stands for A := A+1, and ’;’ denotes sequentiality. Assignments separated
by ’,’ on the right side of −→ could happen in any order. Variables not mentioned
in transitions remain unchanged.
Figure 3 gives the formal specification of the TTP membership algorithm.
The protocol is composed of two inputs and N processes P [i] running in parallel.
The inputs of the protocol are the parameter N and a boolean fault which is true
in case a fault occurs. Each station P is a non-deterministic finite state machine
extended with local variables. The local variables are the counters A and F for CAcc
and CFail, the membership vector m, the variable t to keep track of the time slots,
and the variable s to remember the identity of the station which is sending when
a fault occurs. Following (Manna and Pnueli 1995), all local variables are marked
with the identity of the station they belong to, which is denoted by [i].
The parallel composition is synchronous and the automata synchronize on the
broadcast message emit.
There are four locations lin, l0, l1 and lF . Location lin is the initial location or
state. When a fault occurs, stations that recognize the fault move to state l0 while
stations that do not recognize the fault move to l1. Stations who are prevented from
sending move to location lF .
Let us go through all transitions of location lin in details. In the initial state lin,
all stations have the same membership vectors. First, suppose that there is no fault.
A station can always emit when it is its turn to do so, expressed in the model by
the condition t[i] = i. The first transition has t[i] = i ∧ ¬fault as guard. The
action performed by that transition is: emit!!, t[i]⊕⊕, A[i] := 1; lin. Put informally,
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in N : int,N > 1 in fault : boolean signal
‖Ni=1 P [i], where P [i] is the following program:
A[i] : int, init N + 1− i F [i] : int, init 0
m[i] : array of boolean, init 1 t[i] : int, init 1 // t for turn
s[i] : int, init 0// identity of the faulty station
loop forever do
lin


⌊⌉ t[i] = i ∧ ¬fault
−→ emit!!, t[i]⊕⊕, A[i] := 1; lin
⌊⌉ t[i] = i ∧ fault
−→ emit!!, t[i]⊕⊕, A[i] := 1, s[i] := t[i]; l1
⌊⌉ t[i] 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ ¬fault
−→ t[i]⊕⊕, A[i]++; lin
⌊⌉ t[i] 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ fault
−→ t[i]⊕⊕, A[i]++, s[i] := t[i]; l1
⌊⌉ t[i] 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ fault
−→ t[i]⊕⊕, F [i]++, s[i] := t[i], m[i][t[i]] := 0; l0
l0


⌊⌉ t[i] = i ∧ A[i] > F [i]
−→ emit!!, t[i]⊕⊕, A[i] := 1, F [i] := 0; l0
⌊⌉ t[i] = i ∧ A[i] ≤ F [i]
−→ ¬emit!!, t[i]⊕⊕; lF
⌊⌉ t[i] 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ m[t[i]] = m[i]
−→ t[i]⊕⊕, A[i]++; l0
⌊⌉ t[i] 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ m[t[i]] 6= m[i]
−→ t[i]⊕⊕, F [i]++,m[i][t[i]] := 0; l0
⌊⌉ t[i] 6= i ∧ ¬emit??
−→ t[i]⊕⊕,m[i][t[i]] := 0; l0
l1



⌊⌉ t[i] = i ∧ A[i] > F [i]
−→ emit!!, t[i]⊕⊕, A[i] := 1, F [i] := 0; l1
⌊⌉ t[i] = i ∧ A[i] ≤ F [i]
−→ ¬emit!!, t[i]⊕⊕; lF
⌊⌉ t[i] 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ i = s[i] ∧ t[i] = s[i] + 2 ∧
(m[t[i]][s[i]] = m[t[i]−1][s[i]] = 0)
−→ t[i]⊕⊕; lF
⌊⌉ t[i] 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ i = s[i] ∧ t[i] = s[i] + 2∧
¬(m[t[i]][s[i]] = m[t[i]−1][s[i]] = 0)
−→ t[i]⊕⊕, A[i]++; l1
⌊⌉ t[i] 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ (i 6= s[i] ∨ t[i] 6= s[i] + 2) ∧m[t[i]] = m[i]
−→ t[i]⊕⊕, A[i]++; l1
⌊⌉ t[i] 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ (i 6= s[i] ∨ t[i] 6= s[i] + 2) ∧m[t[i]] 6= m[i]
−→ t[i]⊕⊕, F [i]++,m[i][t[i]] := 0; l1
⌊⌉ t[i] 6= i ∧ ¬emit??
−→ t[i]⊕⊕,m[i][t[i]] := 0; l1
lF


⌊⌉ t[i] = i
−→ ¬emit!!, t[i]⊕⊕; lF
⌊⌉ t[i] 6= i
−→ t[i]⊕⊕; lF
end loop
Fig. 3. The algorithm with N stations and 1 fault, M1.
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when it is its turn to emit and there is no fault, a station sends a frame, increments
the variable t by 1 modulo N , resets the counter A to 1 and, then, remains in state
lin. The third transition models the behaviour of a receiving station when there is
no fault. In that case, it always recognizes as correct frames sent by other stations.
This is expressed in the model by the guard t[i] 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ ¬fault. These two
guards, from the first and third transition, for two different processes i and j are true
simultaneously. Indeed, in the synchronous model of computation, a computational
step ’takes no time’ (Benveniste and Berry 1991), therefore the emission of emit by
process i is synchronous with its reception by all other processes. When the parallel
statement is finished, all stations have incremented t by 1, the emitting station has
reset A to 1 while other stations have incremented A. Counter F stays at its initial
value 0 since it is not incremented in transitions containing the condition ¬fault.
Suppose now that there is a fault, which is modeled by the condition fault.
For an emitting station, this is the second transition. The action taken by the
emitting station is similar to the first transition, except that it records its identity
with s[i] := t[i] and then moves to location l1 since, by the confidence principle, a
station never thinks of itself as faulty (rather receiving stations are faulty). For a
receiving station the guard t[i] 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ fault is true. The occurrence of an
asymmetric fault is modeled by a non-deterministic choice represented by the fourth
and fifth transitions. The information of whether a station recognizes the fault is
recorded in the control via locations l0 and l1. If a receiving station recognizes the
fault, it increases F by 1, F [i]++, memorizes the identity of the faulty station,
s[i] := t, puts the membership bit of the sending station to 0, m[i][t[i]] := 0 and
moves to l0 (fifth transition). If a station does not recognize the fault, it increases
A by 1, A[i]++, and moves to l1.
In location l0, a station behaves as follows. In its time slot, t[i] = i, either it
passes the clique avoidance mechanism, A[i] > F [i] (first transition), and emit,
emit!!, reset its counters, A[i] := 1, F [i] := 0, increments the time slot, t[i]⊕⊕, and
stays in l0, or the clique avoidance mechanism fails A[i] ≤ F [i] (second transition),
it cannot emit, ¬emit!!, and goes to the fail state lF . Outside its time slot, t[i] 6= i,
if a message has been broadcast, emit??, and it has the same membership vector
as the sending station, m[t[i]] = m[i] (third transition), it increases the counter of
accepted messages, A[i]++, increments the time slot, t[i]⊕⊕, and stays in l0; if it
does not have the same membership vector as the sending station, m[t[i]] 6= m[i]
(fourth transition), it increases the counter of failed messages, F [i]++, puts the
membership bit of the sending station to 0, m[i][t[i]] := 0, increments the time
slot, t[i]⊕⊕, and stays in l0. Finally, if no message has been broadcast, ¬emit??
(fifth transition), it puts the membership bit of the station that failed sending to
0, m[i][t[i]] := 0, and stays in l0.
In location l1, transitions are similar except that two more transitions are added
to cover the result of CheckI and CheckII using Propositions 6 and 7. These are
the third and the fourth transitions. If the sending station is the second successor
of the faulty station, t[i] = s[i] + 2, and the two successors of the faulty station
have the membership bit of s[i] to 0, m[t[i]]s[i] = m[t[i] − 1]s[i] = 0, then station
s[i] moves to lF , otherwise station s[i] stays in l1.
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In location lF , stations keep only track of the time slot, they cannot send and
stay there.
4.3 Construction of an abstract model
We show in this section the construction of a counter automaton which is an ab-
stract model of the parametrized membership algorithm for an arbitrary number of
components N . In order to simplify the presentation and the proof of the abstrac-
tion, we present this construction in several basic steps. The aim of the first steps is
to encode the infinite-data-domain local variables of the N components with a finite
number of global variables (counters). Then, the last step is a counter abstraction
which encodes the control configurations (for N components) with global variables
counting the number of components at each control location.
In the sequel, we give the different abstraction steps by defining each time the
abstract model and by showing that it (bi)simulates the previous one.
4.3.1 Eliminating identical locals t and s
The first transformation we perform is to replace N local variables t[i] and s[i] by
two global counters tG and sG. It relies on the following fact:
Lemma 4.1
The two following properties are invariants of the program M1:
1. ∀i, j ∈ {1 . . .N} : (t[i] = t[j] ∧ s[i] = s[j])
2. ∃!i ∈ {1 . . .N} : t[i] = i
In other words, at any computation step, all processes P [i] have identical values
for locals s[i] and t[i] and there is exactly one process whose identity is t[i]. We
define a program M2 where these local variables are replaced by tG and sG in the
following manner. We modify the transitions in order to encode the updates of the
local variables as updates of the global ones. Since all processes are synchronous,
these updates must be done by exactly one component. We choose that this will be
done by the component for whom it is the turn to emit, i.e., who satisfies t[i] = i.
So, the program M2 is obtained from M1 by applying the following transforma-
tions: (1) initialize tG and sG to 1 and 0 respectively, (2) replace each occurrence
of t[i] in the guards by tG, and (3) in all the guarded commands, if t[i] = i appears
in the guard, then replace t[i] by tG (resp. s[i] by sG), else remove the update
statements of t[i] and s[i].
For example the second transition at location lin, see Figure 3, is transformed
into
tG = i ∧ fault −→ emit!!, t
⊕⊕
G , A[i] := 1, sG := tG; l1
We establish now that M2 bisimulates M1. For that, let us consider the relation
α1,2 between states of M1 and M2 such that, for every σ1 a state of M1, and for
every σ2 a state of M2, we have α1,2(σ1, σ2) if and only if (1) σ2 and σ1 coincide
on all locations and variables different from the locals t and s, and the globals tG
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and sG, and (2) σ2(tG) = σ1(t[i]) and σ2(sG) = σ1(s[i]) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
i.e., the value of tG and sG in σ2 is the same as the value of t[i], respectively s[i] in
σ1. Then, it can easily be checked that the relation α1,2 is a bisimulation between
the transition systems of M1 and M2.
4.3.2 Eliminating locals A and F
Based on Theorem 8, we define a new model where local variables A and F are
simulated by global counters d0, d1, C0, and C1; the counters C0 and C1 stand for
|S0 | and |S1 | respectively. We need in addition a variable r to count the current
round and a variable Cp which counts the number of steps performed in the current
round.
We define hereafter a program M3 obtained from M2 by the following transfor-
mations: (1) transitions starting at location lin where the fault is detected (fault
appears in the guard), replace A[i] and F [i] by C1 and C0 respectively. (2) each
transition starting from locations l0 and l1 which corresponds to an emit action
(where tG = i appears in the guard) is duplicated into three transition correspond-
ing to the cases where the execution is inside the first round, is inside some later
round, or is precisely at the beginning of a new round. The comparisons of A and
F in the guards and their updates are replaced by corresponding comparisons and
updates on C0, C1, d0, and d1, according to Theorem 8. (3) all other statements
involving A and F are removed.
For example the fourth transition at location lin :
tG 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ fault −→ t
⊕⊕
G , A[i] := 1; l1
is transformed into
tG 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ fault −→ t
⊕⊕
G , C1
⊕⊕; l1.
The second transition at location l0 :
tG = i ∧ A[i] ≤ F [i] −→ ¬emit!!, t
⊕⊕
G ; lF
is duplicated into three transitions t1, t2, t3 as follows:
tG = i ∧ C0 + C1 ≤ 2× d1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0 −→ ¬emit!!, t
⊕⊕
G , C
++
p , C
−−
0 ; lF
tG = i ∧ C0 ≤ C1 ∧ Cp = N −→ ¬emit!!, t
⊕⊕
G , Cp := 1, r
++, C−−0 ; lF .
tG = i ∧ C0 ≤ C1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0 −→ ¬emit!!, t
⊕⊕
G , C
++
p , C
−−
0 ; lF
The obtained program M3 is bisimilar to M2 by Theorem 8.
4.3.3 Eliminating the local m
At this stage, we can see that the information given by m is not relevant anymore
except in the case where a faulty station must leave the active state because its
first and second successors have recognized it as faulty. To deal with this case, we
replace the test on the vector m by the faulty station with a guess of the diagnostic
of its two immediate successors (checkI and checkII). This guess is made exactly
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one round after the fault. For that, we simply perform a nondeterministic choice
whether to leave or to stay in the active state. It turns out that this abstraction is
precise enough for our purpose.
Then, we define a new program M4 obtained from the program M3 by (1)
removing the transitions starting from l1 involving tests on the membership bit
vectors of the two immediate successors, (2) duplicating the transitions from l1 for
the case (Cp = N) ∧ (r = 0) into two transitions corresponding to the actions of
leaving or staying in the active state with g to fix the choice, and (3) removing all
the remaining statements involving m.
Moreover, after the transformation above, guarded commands starting at l0 and
l1 which involve the test tG 6= i can actually be compacted into trivial self loops.
This leads to the program M4 given in Figure 4. One shows that this program
simulates the program M3 by induction.
4.3.4 Strengthening guards
Before the counter abstraction step where identities of processes will be lost, we
need to strengthen the guards using some invariants of the system.
Lemma 4.2
The following statements are invariants of the program M4:
1. ∀i (l0[i] ∧ tG = i ∧ C0 + C1 > 2× d1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0) ⇒ d0 < C0 )
2. ∀i (l0[i] ∧ tG = i ∧ C0 + C1 ≤ 2× d1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0) ⇒ d0 < C0 )
3. ∀i (l1[i] ∧ tG = i ∧ C0 + C1 > 2× d0 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0) ⇒ d1 < C1 )
4. ∀i (l1[i] ∧ tG = i ∧ C0 + C1 ≤ 2× d0 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0) ⇒ d1 < C1 )
Invariant (1) in the lemma above says that when process P [i] is at location l0,
if it is the turn of this process to emit, and if it is allowed to emit in the round
following the fault, then not all stations from the set S0 have emitted in that round.
This is due to the fact that d0 counts stations from the set S0 that have emitted in
that current round.
Thus, at location l0, the guard tG = i ∧ C0 + C1 > 2× d1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0
can be strengthened into tG = i ∧ C0+C1 > 2×d1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0 ∧ d0 < C0
without changing the semantics of the program. We do similar transformation using
the other invariants.
Further, we update d0 and d1 in other transitions at l0 and l1 so that they keep
counting the number of stations from the set S0, S1 respectively, that have emitted
in subsequent rounds. In that way, we obtain more invariants similar to the ones
given in Lemma 4.2 and we use them to strengthen guards without changing the
semantics of the program.
For example, at l0 transition
tG = i ∧ C0 > C1 ∧ Cp = N −→ emit!!, t
⊕⊕
G , Cp := 1, r
++; l0
is changed into
tG = i ∧ C0 > C1 ∧ Cp = N −→ emit!!, t
⊕⊕
G , d0 := 0, Cp := 1, r
++; l0
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in N : int, N > 1 C0 : int, init 0 tG : int, init 1 r : int, init 0
in fault : bool. signal C1 : int, init 1 sG : int, init 0 d0 : int, init 0
in g : bool. signal Cp : int, init 1 d1 : int, init 1
‖Ni=1 P [i], where P [i] is the following program:
loop forever do
lin


⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ ¬fault
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G ; lin
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ fault
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , sG := tG; l1
⌊⌉ tG 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ ¬fault
−→ ; lin
⌊⌉ tG 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ fault
−→ C++1 ; l1
⌊⌉ tG 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ fault −→ C
++
0 ; l0
l0


⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C0 + C1 > 2× d1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , d
++
0 ; l0
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C0 > C1 ∧ Cp = N
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , Cp := 1, r
++; l0
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C0 > C1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p ; l0
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C0 + C1 ≤ 2× d1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , C
−−
0 ; lF
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C0 ≤ C1 ∧ Cp = N
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , Cp := 1, r
++, C−−0 ; lF
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C0 ≤ C1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , C
−−
0 ; lF
⌊⌉ tG 6= i −→ ; l0
l1


⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C0 + C1 > 2× d0 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , d
++
1 ; l1
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C1 > C0 ∧ Cp = N ∧ r 6= 0
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , Cp := 1, r
++; l1
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C1 > C0 ∧ Cp = N ∧ r = 0 ∧ ¬g
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , Cp := 1, r
++; l1
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C1 > C0 ∧ Cp = N ∧ r = 0 ∧ g
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , Cp := 1, r
++, C−−1 ; lF
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C1 > C0 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p ; l1
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C0 + C1 ≤ 2× d0 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , C
−−
1 ; lF
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C1 ≤ C0 ∧ Cp = N
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , Cp := 1, r
++, C−−1 ; lF
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ C1 ≤ C0 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , C
−−
1 ; lF
⌊⌉ tG 6= i −→ ; l1
lF



⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ Cp < N
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p ; lF
⌊⌉ tG = i ∧ Cp = N
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
′
p := 1, r
++; lF
⌊⌉ tG 6= i −→ ; lF
end loop
Fig. 4. Eliminating all locals, M4.
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and transition
tG = i ∧ C0 > C1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0 −→ emit!!, t
⊕⊕
G , C
++
p ; l0
is changed into
tG = i ∧ C0 > C1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0 −→ emit!!, t
⊕⊕
G , d
++
0 , C
++
p ; l0.
It can be shown that
∀i (l0[i] ∧ tG = i ∧ C0 > C1 ∧ Cp = N) ⇒ d0 = C0 )
is an invariant and therefore the guard can be strengthened into
tG = i ∧ C0 > C1 ∧ Cp = N ∧ d0 = C0.
Similarly to transitions starting from l0 and l1 we need to strengthen the guards of
the transitions starting from lF . For that, we introduce two supplementary counters
dF and CF –initial value 0– which play a similar roˆle for location lF as counters d0
and C0 do for location l0. We use invariants similar to those given in the lemma
above to strengthen all guards at l0, l1 and lF .
The last guard strengthening we perform makes use of Proposition 6 that says
that if the faulty station leaves the active state because of its first and second
successor, then the two stations following it do not belong to S1, but to S0. In
other words, a station from S1 emitting in the first round following the fault with
g cannot be the first nor the second station following the faulty station. Therefore,
at location l1, the guard of transition
tG = i ∧ C1 > C0 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0 −→ emit!!, t
⊕⊕
G , C
++
p ; l1
is strengthened into
tG = i ∧ C1 > C0 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0∧ (r 6= 1∨¬g ∨Cp 6= 1∨Cp 6= 2) without
changing the semantics of the program.
We obtain a transformed program M5 bisimilar to program M4.
4.3.5 Counter abstraction
We are now ready to perform the usual counter abstraction where individual control
locations lin, l0, l1 and lF are replaced by counters Cin, C0, C1 and CF respectively
counting how many processes are at these locations and obtain a single extended
finite state machine with a single location, which is then omitted (Delzanno 2000).
Then, we define a new program M6 obtained from the program M5 by (1)
transforming transition l : g → a; l′ into Cl > 0 ∧ g → a, C
−−
l , C
++
l′ , where
l, l′ are locations or control states and Cl,Cl′ the associated counters, (2) replacing
any condition involving i by true, (3) packing into a single abstract transition all
transitions from M5 where guards evaluate to true simultaneously.
For example, the two transitions of M5 at lin
tG = i ∧ ¬fault −→ emit!!, t
⊕⊕
G ; lin
and
tG 6= i ∧ emit?? ∧ ¬fault −→ ; lin
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give the abstract transition:
Cin > 0 ∧ emit?? ∧ ¬fault −→ emit!!, t
⊕⊕
G .
We obtain programM6 shown in Figure 5. The initial value of x guesses the number
of processes that move from location lin to l1.
Such a counter abstraction simulates the previous models and verifies the prop-
erty that the value of any counter Cl at some state σ
′ is exactly the number of
processes at location l in the corresponding state σ.
Thus, if we show that C1 or C0 evaluate to 0 in the program given in Figure 5,
we know that set S0 or S1 is empty in the concrete model, establishing that there
is no clique.
4.4 Proving properties
We have used the system given Figure 5, with a slight change concerning rounds,
to prove automatically properties of the protocol. We have used an automaton
where rounds are represented by states, rather than by the variable r. We make
the distinction between the first round after the fault, and later rounds. Condition
r = 0 is equivalent to the automaton being in state round1 while r > 0 is equivalent
to the automaton being in state later round. Further, the automaton leaves state
later round to go to a state normal when cliques are stable.
A first property, called M1, that has been proved as true, is that at the end of
the first round after the fault:
!(C1 = C0) (P1).
P1 means that, when the first round after the fault is over, either |S1 |>|S0 | or
|S0 |>|S1 |, whatever the original partition {S1, S0} was when the fault occurred.
We have analyzed what leads to C1 > C0, or C0 > C1 after 1 round.
First, we have shown that, if | S1 |>| S0 | when the fault occurs, then C1 > C0
after one round, and vice-versa. Adding the constraint x > N − x, we have proved
that, at the end of the first round after the fault :
(x = C1) (P2).
Since counters C1 and C0 may not increase, this implies C1 > C0 when r > 0. It
also implies that all stations from S1 did send in the first round.
Then we have investigated the case |S1 |=|S0 | when the fault occurs. If set S1
comes first in the statical order, then C1 > C0, and vice versa if S0 comes first.
Adding the constraint x = N − x we have proved:
AG ((d1 = x and d0 < x)⇒ AG (C1 = x)) (P3),
AG ((d1 = x and d0 < x)⇒ (C1 + C0 − 2 ∗ d1 <= 0)) (P4).
Again, this implies C1 > C0 after the first round. It also implies that all stations
from S1 did send in the first round.
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in N : int, N > 1 C0 : int, init 0 tG : int, init 1 r : int, init 0
in fault : bool. signal C1 : int, init 1 sG : int, init 0 d0 : int, init 0
in g : bool. signal Cp : int, init 1 d1 : int, init 1 dF : int, init 0
in x : int, x ≥ 1 Ci : int, init N CF : int, init 0
loop forever do

⌊⌉ Ci > 0 ∧ emit?? ∧ ¬fault
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G
⌊⌉ Ci > 0 ∧ emit?? ∧ fault
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , s
′
G := tG, C
′
1 := x,C
′
0 := N − x,C
′
i := 0
⌊⌉ C0 > 0 ∧ d0 < C0 ∧ C0 +C1 > 2× d1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , d
++
0
⌊⌉ C0 > 0 ∧ d0 = C0 ∧ C0 > C1 ∧ Cp = N
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
′
p := 1, r
++, d′0 := 1, d
′
1 := 0, d
′
F := 0
⌊⌉ C0 > 0 ∧ d0 < C0 ∧ C0 > C1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , d
++
0
⌊⌉ C0 > 0 ∧ d0 < C0 ∧ C0 +C1 ≤ 2× d1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , C
−−
0 , C
++
F , d
++
F
⌊⌉ C0 > 0 ∧ d0 = C0 ∧ C0 ≤ C1 ∧ Cp = N
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
′
p := 1, r
++, C−−0 , C
++
F , d
′
0 := 0, d
′
F := 1, d
′
1 := 0
⌊⌉ C0 > 0 ∧ d0 < C0 ∧ C0 ≤ C1 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , C
−−
0 , C
++
F , d
++
F
⌊⌉ C1 > 0 ∧ d1 < C1 ∧ C0 +C1 > 2× d0 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , d
++
1
⌊⌉ C1 > 0 ∧ d1 = C1 ∧ C1 > C0 ∧ Cp = N ∧ (r 6= 0 ∨ ¬g)
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
′
p := 1, r
++, d′1 := 1, d
′
0 := 0, d
′
F := 0
⌊⌉ C1 > 0 ∧ d1 = C1 ∧ C1 > C0 ∧ Cp = N ∧ r = 0 ∧ g
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
′
p := 1, r
++, d′1 := 0, d
′
F := 1, d
′
0 := 0, C
++
F
⌊⌉ C1 > 0 ∧ d1 < C1 ∧ C1 > C0 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0 ∧
(r 6= 1 ∨ ¬g ∨ Cp 6= 1 ∨ Cp 6= 2)
−→ emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , d
++
1
⌊⌉ C1 > 0 ∧ d1 < C1 ∧ C0 +C1 ≤ 2× d0 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r = 0
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , C
−−
1 , C
++
F , d
++
F
⌊⌉ C1 > 0 ∧ d1 = C1 ∧ C1 ≤ C0 ∧ Cp = N
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
′
p := 1, r
++, C−−1 , C
++
F , d
′
F := 1, d
′
1 := 0, d
′
0 := 0
⌊⌉ C1 > 0 ∧ d1 < C1 ∧ C1 ≤ C0 ∧ Cp < N ∧ r > 0
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , C
−−
1 , C
++
F , d
++
F
⌊⌉ CF > 0 ∧ dF < CF ∧ Cp < N
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
++
p , d
++
F
⌊⌉ CF > 0 ∧ dF = CF ∧ Cp = N
−→ ¬emit!!, t⊕⊕G , C
′
p := 1, r
++, d′F := 1, d
′
0 := 0, d
′
1 := 0
end loop
Fig. 5. The abstract model M6.
To prove the main property, we have first shown that, if r > 0, when one round
is completed, it is not possible to start a new round where both C1 and C0 are not
0, i.e., S1 and S0 are both not empty.
Indeed the property below is true when r > 0:
AG ¬(¬(C1 = 0) and ¬(C0 = 0) and (Cp = N)) (P6).
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Finally, we proved that, at the end of the second round after the fault, i.e., when
Cp = N and the automaton goes to state normal:
AG (C1 = 0 or C0 = 0) (P7).
P7 means that either S1 or S0 is empty at the end of the second round. Hence, all
active stations have the same membership vectors at the end of the second round
and form again a single clique in the graph theoretical sense.
5 Automatic Verification: the k Faults Case
To be able to calculate precisely CAccs and CFails using global counters only,
see Theorem 8, is what makes possible the construction of an abstract model in
the 1-fault case. For the k-faults case, the same approach can be taken. Provided
that one is able to calculate precisely CAccs and CFails using global counters, first
a behavioural model for a scenario of the k-fault case is constructed, then this
behavioural model can be transformed into successive models that simulate each
other, replacing local variables with global counters, till the final counter abstraction
is obtained and verified automatically, as has been done for the 1-fault case. Thus,
what is needed is to establish a generalisation of Theorem 8 for the k-faults case.
5.1 Calculating CAccs and CFails
Let 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By Proposition 3, after the occurrence of fault i,W , the set of active
stations, is partitioned into sets Sw with w ∈ {0, 1}i. We find it handy for the
following to indicate the length of the string w with the superscript i. We associate
two counters Cwi and dwi to each set Swi that is formed after the occurrence
of any fault i. The counters Cwi counts how many stations belong to set Swi
when fault i occurs. The counters dwi count how many stations from the set Swi
have sent between fault i and fault i + 1 in case i < k, and counts how many
stations from the set Swi have sent so far in the first round following fault k in
case i = k. Again because of Proposition 3, we assume that, for any w ∈ {0, 1}i−1,
Cwi−11 + Cwi−10 = Cwi, Cwi−11 ≥ 1 and dwi−11 ≥ 1. Further, for each fault i,
we associate a counter Cp(i) that counts how many time slots have elapsed since
fault i.
The creation of counters is illustrated taking a particular scenario in Figure 7.
After 1 fault, active stations split into two sets, S0, the stations that have not
received the frame correctly and S1 the stations that have received the frame cor-
rectly. Four counters are created: C01 contains the number of stations from S0, C11
contains the number of stations from S1, d01 counts the stations from S0 that are
sending frames, d11 counts the stations from S1 that are sending frames. d11 ≥ 1
since the station that was sending when the fault occurred is from S1. Each time a
station from S1, respectively from S0 is prevented from sending, then S1 and C11 ,
respectively S0 and C01 , are decreased by 1. Suppose that a second fault occurs
when some station from S1 emits. Then S1 splits into S10 and S11 and six new
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W
fault 1, Cp(1)C11 , d11 C01 , d01
fault 2, Cp(2)C002 , d002C112 , d112 C102 , d102
fault 3, Cp(3)C1103 , d1103 C1003 , d1003 C0013 , d0013 C0003 , d0003
fault 4, Cp(4)C11004 , d11004 C00104 , d00104 C00004 , d00004
C10014 , d10014 C10004 , d10004
Fig. 6. Illustrating the creation of counters up to 4 faults.
s s s s s s
dw d , dA
i
i i+1 k i
w wk kF
kdw
acc−s, C fail−sC
Fig. 7. Evaluating CAccs and CFails after fault k.
counters are created: C002 , which is, in this scenario, initially equal to the present
value of C01 , C102 , to count the number of stations in S10, C112 to count the number
of stations in S11, d002 to count the number of stations from S00 (which is, in this
scenario, the same as S0) that are sending frames after the second fault – note that
d01 is not incremented anymore after the occurence of fault 2– d102 to count the
number of stations from S10 that are sending frames after the second fault, and d112
to count the number of stations from S11 that are sending frames after the second
fault. Again, d112 ≥ 1 since the station that was sending when the fault occured is
from S11. In Figure 6, one assumes that a third fault occurs when a station from
set S00 is sending and a fourth fault occurs when a station from set S100 is sending.
Thus, for k faults and a particular scenario, Σi=ki=12(i+1) + k counters so far are
created.
These counters are almost enough to know CAccs and CFails for any station
s in the first round following fault k. Indeed, let s be a station ready to send. s
belongs to some set Swk . In the rounds preceding fault k and during the round
following fault k, s recognizes as correct frames sent by stations from Sw′ , where
w′ is a prefix of wk, and recognizes as incorrect all other frames. This information
is recorded with the counters dwi, w ∈ {0, 1}i and 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
There is one more subtlety. The clique avoidance mechanism needs that CAccs
and CFails count one round only, the round being relative to the position of the
sending station s. To do so properly, we distinguish two cases.
The first case is when fault k occurs in the first round following fault 1 and the
time slot of s still belongs to that round. One must take into account that s has
recognized as correct all stations that have sent before fault 1, which is a straight
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generalization of Theorem 8. For example, consider the scenario of Figure 6 and a
station s from set S0010. Then:
CAccs =|W | −d11−d112−d102−d1103−d1003−d0003−d11004−d10014−d10004−d00004 ,
CFails = d11 + d112 + d102 + d1103 + d1003 + d0003 + d11004 + d10014 + d10004 + d00004 .
The second case is when the time slot of the sending station s lies between station
si and si+1 and fault k occurs in the first round following fault i, i > 1. After fault i,
s belongs to some set Swi and the number of frames accepted as correct by s is given
by dwi. However, to count correctly CAccs, dw
i is too much. One has to withdraw
all stations accepted by s whose time slots are between si and s. This is illustrated
in Figure 7. We introduce auxiliary counters dAwk and dFwk. These counters are
set to 0 when fault k occurs. Counter dAwk counts how many stations from set
Swk have sent so far, as counters dw
k do, and counter dFwk counts how many
stations from set Swk were prevented from sending so far by the clique avoidance
mechanism and moved to the set of non-working stations. The difference with dwk
is that these counters are reset to 0 each time a counter Cp(i) reaches N after
fault k. Thus dwi −Σw′kd
Aw′
k −Σw′kd
Fw′
k
, with wi a prefix of w′
k
, gives exactly
how many frames between s and si+1 the station s has recognized as correct in
the round, and dwi − Σw′kd
Aw′
k − Σw′kd
Fw′
k
+ dwi+1 + · · · + dwk gives exactly
how many frames in total s has recognized as correct in the round, i.e., CAccs. For
example, consider again the example illustrated in Figure 6 and a station s from
set S0010. Suppose fault 4 occurs in the first round following fault 2 and station s
lies between s2 and s3, the stations that were emitting when fault 2, respectively
fault 3, occurred. Then:
CAccs = d002 + d0013 + d00104 − d
A
00104
− dA
00004
− dF
00104
− dF
00004
.
A similar idea works for CFails. This is formally stated in the proposition below.
Proposition 9
We indicate by ws that the string w refers to an entity where s belongs.
1. Let s ∈ Swks a station ready to send in the round following fault k.
(a) If Cp(1) ≤ N at the time slot of s, then:
CAccs =|W | −Σw′dw′, and CFails = Σw′dw′,
where w′ must not be a prefix of wks .
(b) Let 1 < i < k such that Cp(i) ≥ N and Cp(i + 1) < N at the
time slot of s. Then:
CAccs = (Σ
j=k
j=i dw
j
s) − Σw′kd
Aw′
k − Σw′kd
Fw′
k
, where wjs is a
prefix of wks and w
i
s is a prefix of all w
′k, and
CFails = (Σ
j=k
j=i Σwj 6=wjsdw
j)− Σwk 6=wks d
Awk − Σwk 6=wks d
Fwk ,
where wk must be a suffix of some wi 6= wis.
2. Let s ∈ Skw a station ready to send in the second round following fault k.
Then:
CAccs = dw
k − dFwk, and
CFails = Σw′kdw
′k − Σw′kd
Fw′
k
with w′
k 6= wk.
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Proof
For 1, the proof follows what has been exposed informally above. For 2, one assumes
counters dwk are kept as there are at the end of the first round, and that dFwk are
reset to 0 and incremented during the second round each time some station from set
Swk is prevented from sending. The result follows, since dw
k contains exactly the
number of stations from set Swk that have sent in the first round following fault k.
5.2 Complexity issues
It follows that, for one scenario of the k faults case, the total number of counters
needed is Σi=ki=12(i+ 1) + k + 2(k + 1). There is Π
i=k
i=1 i possible scenarios to check.
Using all these counters, an extended automaton similar to the one given in Fig-
ure 5 can be designed and, in theory, automatically verified. Properties analogous
to P6 and P7 have to be checked to prove that after the second round follow-
ing fault k, there is only 1 clique. However, in practice, tools that are presently
available do not make it possible to handle such a number of counters already
for two faults1. Though, a scenario for two faults has been successfully verified in
(Bardin et al. 2004) using their tool FAST after performing further ad hoc abstrac-
tions to reduce the number of counters.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed an approach for verifying automatically a complex algorithm
which is industrially relevant. The complexity of this algorithm is due to its very
subtle dynamic which is hard to model. We have shown that this dynamic can
be captured by means of unbounded (parametric) counter automata. Even if the
verification problem for these infinite-state models is undecidable in general, there
exists many symbolic reachability analysis techniques and tools which allow to
handle such models.
Our approach allows to build a model (counter automaton) for the algorithm
with an arbitrary number n of stations, but for a given number k of faults. We have
experimented our approach by verifying in a fully automatic way the model in the
case of one fault, using the ALV tool and the LASH tool.
Related Work: (Bauer and Paulitsch 2000) provides a manual proof of the al-
gorithm in the 1 fault case. Theorem 4 generalizes this result to the case of any
number of faults. As far as we know, all the existing works on automated proofs
or verifications of the membership algorithm of TTP concern the case of one fault,
and only symmetric fault occurrences are assumed. In our work, we consider the
more general framework where several faults can occur, and moreover, these faults
can be asymmetric. In (Pfeifer 2000), a mechanised proof using PVS is provided.
(Katz et al. 1997; Baukus et al. 2000; Creese and Roscoe 1999) adopt an approach
1 In the case of two faults, we got memory problems both with ALV and LASH.
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based on combining abstraction and finite-state model-checking. (Katz et al. 1997)
has checked the algorithm for 6 stations. (Baukus et al. 2000; Creese and Roscoe 1999)
consider the parametric verification of n stations; (Creese and Roscoe 1999) pro-
vides an abstraction proved manually whereas (Baukus et al. 2000) uses an auto-
matic abstraction generation technique, both abstractions leading to a finite-state
abstraction of the parameterized network. The abstractions used in those works
seem to be non-extensible to the case of asymmetric faults and to the k faults case.
To tackle this more general framework, we provide an abstraction which yields a
counter automaton and reduce the verification of the algorithm to the symbolic
reachability analysis of the obtained infinite-state abstract model. Moreover, our
abstraction is exact in the sense that it models faithfully the emission of frames by
stations.
Future Work: Our future work is to automatize, for instance using a theorem
prover, the abstraction proof which allows to build the counter automaton modeling
the algorithm. More generally, an important issue is to design automatic abstraction
techniques allowing to produce infinite-state models given by extended automata.
Finally, a challenging problem is to design an algorithmic technique allowing to
verify automatically the algorithm by taking into account simultaneously both of
its parameters, i.e., for any number of stations and for any number of faults.
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